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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
HARRY KIRK CREAMER, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE OGDEN UNION RAILWAY 
AND DEPOT COMPANY, a corpor-
ation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
7664 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
Respondent's brief presents certain arguments which 
are so basically erroneous that they should not pass un-
challenged : 
( 1) Respondent, hereinafter referred to as the plain .. 
tiff, argues by his brief that the defendant was negligent as 
to a class of which the plaintiff was a member, and con-
sequently, was negligent as to the plaintiff (Respondent's 
Brief 22, et seq.) . 
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(2) The plaintiff argues that this case should have 
been submitted to a jury because jury trial is "a basic and 
fundamental feature of our system of federal jurispru-
dence and is part and parcel of the remedy afforded rail-
road workers under the Federal Employers' Liability Act" 
(Respondent's Brief 41, et seq.). 
( 3) The plaintiff argues that Instruction No. 15, if 
erroneous, does not constitute prejudicial error because the 
defendant makes no claim that the damages awarded were 
excessive (Respondent's Brief 47, 49). 
Answering these three arguments in their inverse order, 
the defendant asserts : 
( 1) The fact that the defendant has not attempted 
to secure a reversal of the judgment in this case for ex-
cessiveness of the damages awarded to the plaintiff does 
not support plaintiff's argument that the error contained 
in Instruction No. 15 did not prejudice the defendant. 
(2) The fact that the Supreme Court of the United 
States has held that close and doubtful cases under the 
Federal Employers' Liability Act should be submitted to 
a jury for determination if there is an evidentiary basis 
for a verdict in favor of the plaintiff does not support the 
plaintiff's argument that this case should have been sub-
mitted to a jury for determination. 
(3) The evidence in the case at bar presented no 
question for submission to a jury on the issue of the de-
fendant's negligence, whether the subject be viewed in the 
light of the defendant's conduct toward the plaintiff or 
toward a class of which the plaintiff was a member. 
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POINT I. 
THE FACT THAT THE DEFENDANT HAS 
NOT ATTEMPTED TO SECURE A REVERSAL 
OF THE JUDGMENT IN THIS CASE FOR EX-
CESSIVENESS OF THE DAMAGES AWARD-
ED TO THE PLAINTIFF DOES NOT SUP-
PORT PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT THE 
ERROR CONTAINED IN INSTRUCTION NO. 
15 DID NOT PREJUDICE THE DEFENDANT. 
At pages 46 and 4 7 of his brief the plaintiff states: 
"Instruction No. 15 is a correct statement of the law and 
did not result in any prejudice to defendant especially 
where it appears that defendant makes no claim that the 
damages awarded were excessive." We do not propose to 
restate here the bases of our contention that Instruction 
No. 15 is argumentative. We think that it is argumentative 
and we have heretofore pointed out the reasons for this 
belief in our original brief. We do propose, however, to 
answer briefly the statement of plaintiff's counsel that 
said instruction, even if argumentative, was not prejudicial 
to the defendant. 
That statement is patently erroneous for the follow-
ing reasons : 
(a) If, as we contend, Instruction No. 15 argues for 
the plaintiff that he should recover some verdict whether 
the defendant was negligent or otherwise, it is obvious 
that the instruction might have affected not only the size 
of the verdict, but also might have influenced the determin-
ation by the jury that the plaintiff should prevail at all. 
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To assert that an instruction which is in argumentative 
form in favor of the plaintiff on the subject of liability 
is not prejudicial to the defendant because the amount of 
the verdict is not excessive, when such instruction may 
have influenced the outcome of the case in so far as liabil-
ity is concerned, is indeed an illogical statement. 
(b) In a suit for personal injuries there is no method 
of determining the plaintiff's damages with mathematical 
precision. Reasonable jurors may and do differ as to the 
amount which should be awarded. Accordingly, the courts 
have deliberately limited their own supervision of the 
size of verdicts in such cases. If the amount awarded falls 
between the minimum figure which reason will support and 
the maximum figure which reasonable jurors would 
award, then the courts refuse to substitute their own judg-
ment for that of the jurors. Duffy v. Union Pacific Rail-
road Company 0 0 0 Utah 0 0 0, 218 P. 2d 1080. As said by 
Mr. Justice Wolfe in the case of Pauly v. McCarthy, 109 
Utah 431, 184 P. 2d 123: 
"The jury is allowed great latitude in assessing 
damages for personal injuries." 
Since the minimum and the maximum amounts be-
tween which a verdict will be permited to stand by the 
courts of this state may well be thousands of dollars apart, 
it is obviously of considerable monetary consequence to 
the parties where between those limits the jury fixes the 
damages. It would therefore seem to follow inescapably 
that an argumentative instruction which induces a jury to 
place the damages in the upper strata between such reason-
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able maximum and minimum limits, as opposed to the 
lower strata between the same limits, has materially pre-
judiced the defendant. Consequently, the failure of the 
defendant to challenge the verdict in the case at bar for 
excessiveness as being above the maximum limit which the 
courts would approve affords no basis whatever for plain-
tiff's conclusion that no prejudice has resulted from an 
argumentative damage instruction such ·as Instruction 
No. 15. 
POINT II. 
THE FACT THAT THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE UNITED STATES HAS HELD THAT 
CLOSE AND DOUBTFUL CASES UNDER THE 
FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACT 
SHOULD BE SUBMITTED TO A JURY FOR 
DETERMINATION IF THERE IS AN EVI-
DENTIARY BASIS FOR A VERDICT IN 
FAVOR OF THE PLAINTIFF DOES NOT SUP-
PORT THE PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT THAT 
THIS CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN SUB-
MITTED TO A JURY FOR DETERMINATION. 
Plaintiff contends that the Supreme Court of the 
United States has ruled that close or doubtful cases under 
the F. E. L.A. should be submitted to juries for determina-
tion and that jury trial is a part of the right of plaintiffs 
under this act. But these platitudes furnish no assistance 
in deciding the issue in the case at bar. Equally well settled 
and supported by authority are the fundamental proposi-
tions that (a) in the absence of evidence of negligence on 
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the part of the defendant the trial court should not sub-
mit a case to a jury for determination, and (b) the jury 
should be properly instructed as to the law which may 
require a judgment for defendant. 
Mr. Justice Wolfe expressed these views in language 
which we cannot improve, as follows : 
"It has been strenuously argued by plaintiff 
that this decision has deprived him of his constitu-
tional right to a jury trial. That contention has been 
urged upon this court in almost every case of non-
suit and directed verdict brought before us. This 
court is charged with the duty of protecting all of 
the rights of all litigants. This is especially true of 
those fundamental rights guaranteed by the State 
and Federal Constitutions. But the right to have a 
jury pass upon issues of fact does not include the 
right to have a cause submitted to a jury in the hope 
of a verdict where the facts undisputably show that 
the plaintiff is not entitled to relief." Raymond v. 
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 113 Utah 26, 191 P. 
2d 137. 
The Supreme Court of the United· States has recogn-
ized that there are cases under the F. E. L. A. which are 
non-liability cases as a matter of law. 
Moore, Administrator v. Chesapeake & Ohio R. 
Co., 340 U. S. 573, 71 S. Ct. 428, 95 L. Ed. 
294; 
Eckenrode v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 335 U. S. 329, 
69 S. Ct. 91, 93 L. Ed. 41; 
Reynolds v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 335 U. 
S. 852, 69 S. Ct. 80, 93 L. Ed. 400. 
In that portion of his brief designated as Point II 
plaintiff cites nine cases decided by the Supreme Court of 
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the United States on facts which have no faint resemblance 
to the facts in the case at bar. Why the decisions of that 
court on different facts have the "controlling effect" men-
tioned at page 46 of plaintiff's brief is not said. Certainly 
these cases do not stand for the proposition that all F. E. 
L. A. cases should be decided by juries. 
We respectfully submit that there is nothing close or 
doubtful about the alleged negligence of the defendant in 
the case at bar. There is an absolute void in so far as any 
evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant con-
tributing to plaintiff's injuries is concerned. Plaintiff's 
argument that the Creamer case should have been submitted 
to a jury because the Supreme Court of the United States 
has held that other cases totally dissimilar on the facts 
should be submitted to a jury is unwarranted. 
POINT III. 
THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE AT BAR PRE-
SENTED NO QUESTION FOR SUBMISSION 
TO A JURY ON THE ISSUE OF THE DEFEND-
ENT'S NEGLIGENCE, WHETHER THE SUB-
JECT BE VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF THE 
DEFENDANT'S CONDUCT TOWARD THE 
PLAINTIFF OR TOWARD A CLASS OF WHICH 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS A MEMBER. 
Despite the camouflage injected by plaintiff's brief, 
the issue to be determined in deciding whether or not this 
case should have been submitted to a jury cannot be ob-
scured. The issue to be determined may be stated concretely 
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as follows: Is it negligent for an employer to require an 
apparently healthy young man to perform hard work with-
out machinery to eliminate the labor. 
The plaintiff argues that the method of icing passenger 
diners used by the defendant company in its operation at 
Ogden constitutes negligence to a class, i.e., coach cleaners; 
that plaintiff was a member of this class, and consequently, 
that the defendant was negligent as to this plaintiff. This 
is indeed a specious argument. We concede that the de-
fendant owes to each and every -one of its employes the 
duty of exercising :reasonable care under all circumstances. 
However, the fact that the standard of care required by the 
law is a constant, denominated reasonable care, does not 
even remotely support the proposition that the quantum of 
care required of the defendant to each of such employes is 
likewise constant. One of the circumstances which de-
termines what amount of care is reasonable care is the 
known characteristics of a person to be affected by the de-
fendant's conduct. As stated in Harper on Torts, Section 
145: 
"Since the matter of the plaintiff's incapacity 
as bearing upon his duty to exercise care for his own 
safety is closely connected, in the actual cases, with 
the defendant's duty to use due care, mention should 
be made here of the latter problem. As to the repair 
of premises or conditions of streets, a defendant owes 
no greater duty toward persons possessed of physical 
infirmities than toward others. But if the plaintiff's 
infirmity or affliction is known to the defendant, the 
standard· of the reasonable man will require him to 
adjust his affirmative conduct with reference to 
such person's infirmities, and he may be guilty of 
negligence for actions which the ordinary prudent 
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person would avoid with respect to them. The known 
incapacity of the plaintiff becomes one of the 'facts 
and circumstances of the case.' and the extent of the 
defendant's duty must be measured accordingly. The 
degree of care required is the same-the care of 
the ordinary reasonable man under the same or sim-
ilar circumstances. But this degree of care obvious-
ly requires different conduct toward children, the 
sick, lame, blind, insane or intoxicated, when such 
incapacity is known, from that required toward 
adult persons of sound limb, faculty and mind. 'A 
sick or aged person, a delicate woman, a lame man, 
or a child is entitled to more attention * * * 
from a railroad company than one in good· health 
and under no disability. They are entitled to more 
time in which to get on or off the cars; they are 
entitled to more consideration when crossing a street, 
to the end that the cars shall not run over them.' 
The point was further brought out in a Texas case in 
which a landlord, with knowledge of the plaintiff's 
pregnancy, entered the leased premises and in the 
presence of the plaintiff made an assault upon some 
negroes which so frightened her that a miscarriage 
resulted. The defendant was held responsible. Since 
the defendant knew of the plaintiff's disability, he 
should have foreseen some such harm, and he is 
therefore negligent. Since the risk of the particular 
harm was one of the very factors which made his 
conduct negligent, there is, of course, no difficulty 
with the problem of legal causation. If the plain-
tiff's incapacity or disability was unknown to the 
defendant, the reasonableness of the latter's conduct 
must be determined without reference thereto." 
The facts and circumstances of the case at bar as dis-
closed by the evidence were that the plaintiff was an ap-
parently healthy, normal young man, about 36 years of age. 
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He was over six feet tall and weighed in excess of 200 
pounds, with at least normal muscular development. Even 
if it could be said (which we deny under the facts in this 
case) that the defendant company would have been negli-
gent had it assigned an aged or weak person, or an individual 
known to be otherwise handicapped, to Creamer's task, this 
cannot help the plaintiff, who possessed no such known 
handicaps. 
Mr. Justice Cardozo discussed the concept of negligence 
and the principles involved in the case of Palsgraf v. ~ong 
Island Railroad Company, 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99, 59 
A. L. R. 1253, at considerable length. He was applying the 
principles to a different fact situation but his analysis is 
equally cogent here. In that case a train of the defendant 
stopped at a station where the plaintiff, a woman, was stand-
ing on the platform waiting for a second train. Two men 
ran forward. to catch the train which had stopped. The 
second man, who was carrying a package, jumped aboard 
the car but seemed about to fall. A guard employed by the 
defendant reached forward to help him and another guard 
on the platform pushed him from behind. During this 
activity the package was dislodged and fell upon the rails. 
The package, which was about 15 inches long, covered by 
newspaper, contained fireworks, although there was nothing 
in its appearance to give notice of its contents. The fire-
works exploded when they fell and the resultant shock threw 
down some scales at the other end of the platform which 
struck the plaintiff. In determining that the defendant was 
not liable to the plaintiff, Mr. Justice Cardozo made the 
following remarks: 
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"If no hazard was apparent to the eye of ordi-
nary vigilance, an act innocent and harmless, at 
least to outward seeming, with reference to her, did 
not take to itself the quality of a tort because it 
happened to be a wrong, though apparently not one 
involving the risk of bodily insecurity, with refer-
ence to some one else. 'In every instance, before 
negligence can be predicated of a given act, back 
of the act must be sought and found a duty to the 
individual complaining, the observance of which duty 
would have averted or avoided the injury.' (Citing 
cases) 'The ideas of negligence and duty are strict-
ly correlative.' (Citing cases) The plaintiff sues in 
her own right for a wrong personal to her, and not 
as the vicarious beneficiary of a breach of duty to 
another. 
* * * * * 
"The passenger far away, if the victim of a wrong 
at all, has a cause of action, not derivative, but orig-
inal and primary. His claim to be protected against 
invasion of his bodily security is neither greater nor 
less because the act resulting in the invasion is a 
wrong to another far removed. In this case, the 
rights that are said to have been violated, the inter-
ests said to have been invaded, are not even of the 
same order. The man was not injured in his person 
nor even put in danger. The purpose of the act, as 
well as its effect, was to make his person safe. If 
there was a wrong to him at all, which may very well 
be doubted it was a wrong to a property interest only, 
the safety of his package. Out of this wrong to 
property, which threatened injury to nothing else, 
there ·has passed, we are told, to the plaintiff by 
derivation or succession a right of action for the 
invasion of an interest of another order, the right to 
bodily security. The diversity of interests emphasizes 
the futility of the effort to build the plaintiff's right 
upon the basis of a wrong to some one else. The gain 
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is one of emphasis, for a like result would follow if 
the interests were the same. Even then, the orbit of 
the danger as disclosed to the eye of reasonable vigi-
lance would be the orbit of the duty. One who jostles 
one's neighbor in a crowd does not invade the rights 
of others standing at the outer fringe when the un-
intended contact casts a bomb upon the ground. The 
wrongdoer as to them is the man who carries the 
bomb, not the one who explodes it without suspicion 
of the danger. Life will have to be made over, and 
human nature transformed, before previsions so ex-
travagant can be accepted as the norm of conduct, 
the customary standard to which behavior must con-
form. 
"The argument for the plaintiff is built upon 
the shifting meanings of such words as 'wrong' and 
'wrongful,' and shares their instability. What the 
plaintiff must show is 'a wrong' to herself, i.e., a 
violation of her own right, and not merely a wrong 
to someone else, nor conduct 'wrongful' because un-
social, but not 'a wrong' to anyone. We are told 
that one who drives at reckless speed through a 
crowded city street is guilty of a negligent act, and 
therefore of a wrongful one, irrespective of the con-
sequences. Negligent the act is, and wrongful in 
the sense that it is unsocial, but wrongful and un-
social in relation to other travelers only because the 
eye of vigilanceperceives the risk of damage. If the 
same act were to be committed on a speedway or a 
race course, it would lose its wrongful quality. The 
risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to 
be obeyed, and risk imports relation; it is risk to 
another or to others within the range of apprehen-
sion." 
In the Palsgraf case the defendant company owed the 
duty of reasonable care to all of its passengers, of which 
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class the plaintiff was certainly a member. But conduct 
which may perhaps have been negligent as to the man with 
the package \vas not negligent as to the plaintiff. 
On similar principles, even if it may be said that the 
method used by the Depot Company for icing diners was 
negligent as to other coach cleaners, it is improper to per-
mit the plaintiff to rely upon such a theory to recover for 
himself. In the absence of knowledge of his impaired health 
or any circumstances from which it may be inferred that 
the defendant should have known of Creamer's impaired 
health, there was no reason for the defendant company to 
perceive danger in assigning this man to the task to be 
undertaken. If it were a fact that the Depot Company 
customarily used hoisting machinery in icing diners when 
employes other than Creamer performed similar work, still 
there would have been no negligence on the part of the Depot 
Company in requiring Creamer to perform the task without 
machinery, unless danger was reasonably to be perceived in 
requiring him so to undertake the task. 
It may be interesting to note the opening sentence of 
the annotation in A. L. R. following the Palsgraf case, supra. 
The annotator there states : 
"The position taken in the majority opinion in 
the reported case that the basis of an action for 
negligence must be a violation of plaintiff's own 
right, and not merely a wrong to someone else, is 
elementary." 
In addition to the fallacy in plaintiff's argument point-
ed out above, there is a second equally conclusive reason for 
rejecting the plaintiff's argument. Even if it be assumed 
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that Creamer may rely upon negligence of the defendant 
toward other coach cleaners as a basis for recovering dam-
ages for loss sustained by him, his position would still be 
hopeless because there is no evidence of negligence as to the 
class to which he belonged. 
There is no evidence in the record which even tends to 
indicate that the defendant assigned any employe to the 
work of icing diners under such circumstances that the de-
fendant knew, or should have known that said employe had 
impaired health which rendered the work dangerous. 
In any event, the duty to use reasonable care toward 
the members of a class requires only that amount of care 
which would be reasonable as to a normal member of such 
class, unless there is knowledge that one or more of the 
members of that class are in fact abnormal. This was clear-
ly established by this court in the case of Bennett v. Pilot 
Products Company, Utah ... , 235 P. 2d 525. In that 
case the plaintiff had used a permanent wave lotion distrib-
uted by the defendant. She developed a dermatitis, for which 
damages were sought on the theory that the defendant was 
negligent in failing to warn her that the lotion would pro-
duce the dermatitis. The evidence disclosed that the lotion 
was harmless to a normal person but that it had produced 
the dermatitis of the plaintiff because she was allergic to a 
mixture of two ingredients contained in the lotion. In hold-
ing that the plaintiff had failed to make a jury question on 
the issue of the defendant's negligence, Mr. Justice Henroid 
speaking for the court said : 
"We are sympathetic with appellant and her mis-
fortune, but cannot requre the merchant to assume 
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the role of absolute insurer against physiological 
idiosyncracy. To do so also would invest the elusive 
ordinary prudent man with a quality of foreseeability 
that would take him out of character completely. 
Every substance, including food which is daily con-
sumed by the public, occasionally becomes anathema 
to him peculiarly allergic to it. To require insurabil-
ity against such an unforeseeable happenstance would 
weaken the structure of common sense, as well as 
present an unreasonable burden on the channels of 
trade." 
The court considered the duty to foresee injury as the 
result of the personal idiosyncracies of the user of the pro-
duct and held as follows : 
"Counsel for appellant very ably urged that 
there was sufficient evidence to reach the jury on 
the question of negligence. Examination of the 
authorities requires that we differ, and in doing so 
we believe that there was no evidence to go to the 
jury on the question of the reasonable foreseeability 
of danger and harm to the normal person contem-
plated by the law. * * * So far as they (certain 
cases to the contrary) sanction recovery by an un-
anticipated few whose sensitivities or allergies are 
not reasonably foreseeable, we cannot accept them. 
Rather we must adhere to the philosophy enunciated 
by the cases reflected in respondent's citations and 
which was put so aptly by Dean Prosser in his work 
on Torts, p. 679, to the effect that: 'The manufacturer 
is at least entitled to assume that the chattel will be 
put to a normal use by a normal user, and is not 
subject to liability where it would ordinarily be safe, 
but injury results from some unusual use or some 
personal idiosyncracy of the user." 
If a merchant whose products are distributed to the 
public at large is not to be required to foresee injury as a 
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result of the personal sensitivities of his potential customers, 
then how can an employer be expected to exercise a greater 
foresight concerning his employes, who are examined by 
competent physicians as a part of their employment. We 
respectfully submit that negligence is the basis of liability 
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act and that the 
plaintiff Creamer cannot recover from the defendant in 
this case. If this verdict is permitted to stand, then any 
employer may be held negligent if he fails to foresee danger 
in honest toil. Such a result offends the basic principles 
of the economic system of this nation. 
Respectfully submitted, 
BRYAN P. LEVERICH, 
M. J. BRONSON, 
A. U. MINER, 
HOWARD F. CORAY, 
D. A. ALSUP, 
Counsel for 
Defendant and Appellant 
10 South Main Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
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